En la psicología genético-dialéctica de H. Wallon se encuentra una manera de abordar el estudio científico del ser humano y su educación que responde a preocupaciones muy actuales; estamos convencidos que contiene unas potencialidades educativas realmente importantes y originales. En este estudio, se parte de sus concepciones psicológicas para llegar a sus derivaciones e implicaciones educativas. No porque consideremos que la pedagogía científica se puede derivar solamente de la psicología ya sea de una manera mecánica o dialéctica, pues su caudal (...) epistemológico es mucho más amplio. (shrink)

In Entities and Indices, M. J. Cresswell argued that a first-order modal language can reach the expressive power of natural-language modal discourse only if we give to the formal language a semantics with indices containing infinite possible worlds and we add to it an infinite collection of operators $${{\varvec{actually}}}_n$$ actually n and $$ Ref _n$$ R e f n which store and retrieve worlds. In the fourth chapter of the book, Cresswell gave a proof that the resulting intensional language, which (...) he called $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, is as expressive as an extensional variant of it, called $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L, which has full quantification over worlds. In both linguistics and philosophy, Cresswell’s book has been viewed as offering a compelling argument for preferring extensional systems in the study of natural language. In this paper, after providing a model-theoretic definition of the relation being as expressive as that can be applied to Cresswell’s languages $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L and $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, we show that the intensional language $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗ is not as expressive as the extensional language $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L. This result, we claim, undermines Cresswell’s argument to the effect that English modal discourse has the power of explicit quantification over worlds. Additionally, we show that $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗ does become as expressive as $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L when we add Cresswell’s operator of universal modality $$\square $$ □ to $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, which provides an extra amount of expressive power. Recently, I. Yanovich has advocated a view that is similar to ours in important respects. At the end of the paper we offer a short discussion of his formalism. (shrink)

Ce livre s’intéresse à une rencontre : celle de deux philosophes, mais aussi celle de deux siècles et de deux régimes de pensée. Leibniz (1646-1716) et Diderot (1713-1784) appartiennent à deux traditions en apparence opposées : on associe généralement la pensée leibnizienne aux grands systèmes métaphysiques du XVIIe siècle, et celle de Diderot à la mise en pièces de ces édifices par la voie d’une philosophie expérimentale radicalement antisystématique. Pourtant, plusieurs liens entre les deux œuvres sont visibles, qu’il s’agisse d’emprunts (...) conceptuels ou thématiques par Diderot ou de convergences plus difficiles à circonscrire. Le premier objet de ce livre est d’identifier ces liens et de faire le point sur cette sympathie entre les deux philosophies. Mais ce livre s’intéresse aussi à cette rencontre pour ses effets transformateurs, tant sur le plan des concepts, des thèses et des arguments que sur celui des méthodes. Il s’agit alors de voir comment la rencontre avec le leibnizianisme a nourri la pensée diderotienne, comment la lecture du texte leibnizien par Diderot en modifie le sens, comment elle peut parfois en être une interprétation ou un devenir possible. Pour saisir ces transformations, les auteurs ont examiné divers contextes théoriques dans lesquels les pensées de Leibniz et Diderot dialoguent : métaphysique et philosophie de la nature, épistémologie et philosophie des sciences, théorie de la perception et esthétique. À travers ce dialogue, l’ouvrage contribue à une réflexion générale sur les méthodes requises pour mettre en perspective les rapports entre des philosophies à la fois proches et éloignées. (shrink)

In this paper we compare the thesis of underdetermination of theories with the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. Drawing upon this comparison, we argue that, in the context of Quine’s philosophy, the thesis of indeterminacy of translation can only be maintained if it is taken as establishing an indeterminacy in the logical form of sentences. Consequently, we contend that Quine lacks a solid argument for indeterminacy of translation.

A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...) of explanatory commitments; and claims that such commitments are satisfied will be as (dis) confirmable as other empirical claims. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Chomsky's Commitment to CRTT Prospects and Problems of CRTT Technical Notions? Does Chomsky Need Intentionality? Chomsky's Dilemma.

Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.

This is a reminiscence and short biographical sketch of the late philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor. It includes a summary of his main proposals about the mind: his “Language of Thought” hypothesis; his rejection of analyticity and conceptual role semantics; his “mad dog nativism”; his proposal of mental modules and—by contrast—his skepticism about a computational theory of central cognition; his anti‐reductionist, but still physicalist, views about psychology; and, lastly, his attacks on selectionism. I conclude with some discussion of his (...) idiosyncratic style and of his aesthetic and other interests. An appendix provides some memorable quotes. (shrink)

Wilson et al. focus on one class of AGL tasks: the cognitively demanding task of detecting non‐adjacent dependencies (NADs) among items. They provide a typology of the different types of NADs in natural languages and in AGL tasks. A range of cues affect NAD learning, ranging from the variability and number of intervening elements to the presence of shared prosodic cues between the dependent items. These cues, important for humans to discover non‐adjacent dependencies, are also found to facilitate NAD learning (...) in several nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

Wilson et al. focus on one class of AGL tasks: the cognitively demanding task of detecting non‐adjacent dependencies (NADs) among items. They provide a typology of the different types of NADs in natural languages and in AGL tasks. A range of cues affect NAD learning, ranging from the variability and number of intervening elements to the presence of shared prosodic cues between the dependent items. These cues, important for humans to discover non‐adjacent dependencies, are also found to facilitate NAD learning (...) in several nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

In 1720, Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande wrote Physicis elementa mathematica, experimentis confirmata. Sive introductio ad philosophiam Newtonianam. Although he was undoubtedly one of the most important popularizers of Newtonian physics, experimental methodology and epistemology in the 1720s, his empirical claim somehow backfired: in applying tenets of Newtonian methodology, he was ultimately led to validate the Leibnizian principle of the conservation of living forces, contrary to the Newtonians. This conclusion invited a great deal of anger, particularly from Samuel Clarke who, in (...) a volume of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society from 1729, accused ’s Gravesande of having written the book with the aim of “darkening Newton’s philosophy”. In a reply, which ’s Gravesande published as a supplement to his Essay upon a New Theory of the Collision of Bodies, he developed a hybrid methodology that relied upon both experimentation and reason. In my paper, I shall thoroughly analyse this interesting combination. (shrink)

The object of this article is to lay bare the consensualist presuppositions implicit within contemporary analyses of the controversies of the Classical Age by proposing an alternative model: agonistic pluralism. The convergence between this political reading of the controversies and an epistemological reading is reinforced by a discussion of Hasok Chang's work, which develops a model of epistemic pluralism that breaks away from studies in the history of science undertaken following the Kuhnian model of scientific revolutions. This makes it possible (...) to question the theoretical convergence of two anti-hegemonic claims: one political, the other epistemological. I aim to put this new model of analysis to the test by applying it to a well known, oft-analysed dispute, that which erupted between Dortous de Mairan and Emilie du Châtelet following the publication of the Institutions de Physique. (shrink)

For all of Brandom’s self-professed allegiance to Hegel, there is something perplexing about his fixation on semantic and epistemological issues at the expense of the type of social and political considerations that are at the heart of Hegel’s system. However, and although Brandom himself concedes that his work is circumscribed to a number of highly specialized and technical issues in the philosophy of mind and language, the truth is that his views often radiate to other philosophical fields, if not always (...) explicitly. My claim in this article is that at the heart of Brandom’s semantic theory, there are elements of a critical project, one that offers a normative standpoint to judge and improve our current practices. Moreover, these progressive features of Brandom’s normative pragmatics should be seen in the light of his adoption of a series of hermeneutic themes, ultimately culminating in his recollective conception of rationality and his edifying view of semantics. (shrink)

Dans la Rome républicaine et impériale, les pleurs accompagnent des événements de la vie privée et publique. Pour agrémenter leurs discours et asseoir leur autorité, des sénateurs, des empereurs et de brillants chefs d’armes n’hésitent pas à verser des larmes quand l’heure est grave. L’effet de leurs sanglots dépend de leur position sociale et de leur renommée : les plaintes d’un aristocrate ont plus de portée que celles d’un simple soldat. Aux femmes, en revanche, les larmes sont souvent interdites (hormis (...) dans le deuil), quand bien même leur « nature » et leur imbecillus animus (Tite-Live, 3, 48, 8) les prédisposent aux pleurs. Le chantage à l’émotion est surtout féminin, pense-t-on. Malgré ses prescriptions de retenue, la philosophie, notamment stoïcienne, n’arrive pas à contrevenir à ce grand usage des larmes, qui est progressivement détourné et revalorisé par les auteurs chrétiens dans leur éloge de la pénitence. (shrink)

Le propos de ce recueil est de développer deux thématiques : raison et folie et déraisons de la raison. D'un côté, on interroge la décision spéculative et politique qui "lie et sépare à la fois raison et folie" dans les termes mêmes employés par Michel Foucault (1961). L'âge classique, le siècle de la raison, commence par constituer un autre de la raison : le fou, renvoyé "au jardin des espèces". Il faut donc revisiter cette archéologie des dualismes mutilants : raison (...) et folie, normal et pathologique, âme et corps, à la lumière des travaux les plus récents. La folie aujourd'hui s'aborde de manière préoccupante dans les politiques de santé mentale qui visent à criminaliser la folie : psychiatrie menacée d'un retour de l'enfermement et de la violence. Psychiatrie sinistrée mais qui est déjà sur la voie de la résistance, notamment dans la culture, comme l'atteste la présence de la mélancolie en son sein, mais aussi dans les développements contemporains de la psychothérapie institutionnelle et de ses équipements comme de ses concepts. Sans négliger d'autres initiatives. Enfin, la rationalité elle-même n'est pas une donnée immédiate de la science. Elle se construit sur fond d'irrationalité. Là aussi, les dualismes familiers et stérilisants sont dissipés. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article propose de concevoir le dissensus moins comme le constat d’un désaccord irréductible que comme le point de départ d’un processus visant à élaborer un territoire épistémique commun. Dans le travail argumentatif de confrontation des désaccords, il ne s’agit pas d’identifier le dispositif qui conduit à un accord via la délibération rationnelle. Il s’agit plutôt de comprendre comment le dissensus permet de construire des communautés plurielles. Il discute certains textes de philosophie politique (Habermas, Mouffe, etc.), où semble centrale (...) la question de l’accord comme horizon d’attente des confrontations argumentatives. L’article utilise cette hypothèse pour analyser la diffusion de la dynamique de Leibniz dans sa correspondance avec De Volder. Cette analyse permet de montrer que le dissensus n’est pas un obstacle mais le socle à partir duquel de multiples diffusions sont possibles. (shrink)